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This paper presents an action research study that looks at the design of a performance
measurement system in a large Chinese state-owned enterprise, focussing on how change
happens. A stakeholder analytical framework is developed to bridge the gaps in western-
developedmodels when they are applied in a Chinese context. Analysis revealed the factors
determining thenature of change and shaping theperformancemeasurement system. Polit-
ical constraints and the unavailability of key databases act as barriers to change, while user
participation and embedding existing practice both contribute to reducing resistance and
promoting continuous improvement. Reinforced by Chinese culture, these factors result in
an evolutionary pattern of change. The study shows that the performance measurement
system of the case company has fulﬁlled symbolic functions to signal strategic focus and to
inﬂuence decision-making.
© 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
This study examines the process of performance
measurement system design in a Chinese state-owned
enterprise (SOE). To do so, it adopts an action research
approach based on a pre-speciﬁed stakeholder analytical
framework. The researchers actively participated in the
designprocess andexperiencedhowchangehappened. The
importance of the study lies in its analysis of factors affect-
ing the nature of management accounting change in the
adoption of ‘imported’ innovation in China, a major devel-
oping economy. It therefore complements much previous
literature on the areas of performance measurement sys-
tem design and management accounting change.
Stimulated by successful experiences of joint ventures
along with ongoing economic reforms, the use of man-
agement accounting techniques has increased in Chinese
SOEs (Firth, 1996; O’Connor et al., 2004, 2006). Factors
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 020 8411 5738;
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affecting the adoption of western management accounting
techniques have attracted attention. Various studies have
found that liberalising forces, such as market competition
(Firth, 1996), foreign joint venture experience (Firth, 1996;
O’Connor et al., 2004), and stock market listing (O’Connor
et al., 2004) are associated with the degree of adoption
of various western management accounting techniques,
including performance measurement.
O’Connor et al. (2006) demonstrate that the intensity of
political constraints negatively mediates the inﬂuence of
these factors and conclude that SOEs need to cope, not only
with economic transformation and market liberalization
but also, with political constraints and regulatory condi-
tions. This supports the ‘forced selection’ perspective in
innovation diffusion as suggested by Abrahamson (1991).
In this perspective, there are a number of organisations
(including government in the case of Chinese state-owned
enterprises) with control and sufﬁcient power to affect the
organisation’s decisions on innovation technology choices.
However, these studies explored why change happens
or does not happen, not how change happens (Busco
et al., 2007). Scant research addresses any questions on
how western management accounting techniques can be
1044-5005/$ – see front matter © 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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effectively applied in the Chinese business environment
and what factors inﬂuence and shape such a system in
its design. Lin and Yu (2002) provide a case study on
a responsibility cost control system applied by a Chi-
nese state-owned iron and steel company. Their research
describes how the systemworks in their case company and
identiﬁes two internal factors contributing to the system’s
success: (i) the professional qualiﬁcation of management
teams and (ii) managers’ enthusiasm for change. However,
it does not provide a systematic analysis of either how this
system has developed or of the factors which may con-
tribute to such development.
In order to obtain an in-depth understanding of how
change happens in China, the researchers actively partici-
pated in the design of a performancemeasurement system
for a Chinese SOE. A stakeholder analytical framework was
proposed in order to address the limitations of existing
performance measurement models developed in western
economies. Most of those models take the objectives and
strategy as a starting point and assume the existence of
clearly stated objectives and strategy, consistency between
stated strategy and strategyundertaken, andeasily identiﬁ-
able critical performance variables. Taking into account the
increased environmental complexity of co-existing market
forces and state inﬂuences, inefﬁcient capital markets, and
increased competition in China (Wei, 2001; Chiou and Lin,
2005; Pistor and Xu, 2005), those assumptions might be
less realistic.
Focusing on the performance measurement system
design process, this study aims to:
(i) explore the effectiveness of the proposed stakeholder
analytical framework in identifying (a) the inﬂuenc-
ing forces behind stated objectives and strategy and (b)
critical performance variables in the context of the case
company; and
(ii) examine the factors shaping the performancemeasure-
ment system and affecting the nature of change in the
case company.
Considerationof these issues sheds lighton thediffusion
process of management accounting innovation and assists
in understanding the nature of management accounting
change in Chinese SOEs.
The study supports the effectiveness of the proposed
stakeholder analytical framework in bridging the gaps
between dynamic external and internal environments,
objectives and strategy, and theperformancemeasurement
system. It reveals that the factors shaping the perfor-
mance measurement system and determining the nature
of change in this case were: expected outcomes, political
constraints, embedding existing practice, user participation,
database unavailability, and culture.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion 2 critically reviews the relevant previous studies and
presentsaproposedstakeholderanalytical framework. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the research methods. Section 4 presents
an analysis of the case and focuses on the effectiveness
of the proposed framework. Section 5 examines the fac-
tors shaping the performance measurement system and
determining the nature of change. Section 6 presents the
conclusions and recommendations for further research.
2. A theoretical framework for the design of
performance measurement systems
2.1. The starting point—objectives and strategy
Most theoretical frameworks for the design of perfor-
mance measurement systems take objectives and strategy
as their starting point. For instance, the balanced scorecard
begins by asking “what do shareholders want?” and trans-
lates the vision and strategy of a business into measures
across four different areas: ﬁnancial, customer, internal
business process, and learning and growth perspectives
(Kaplan and Norton, 1992). Otley (1999) also starts with
objectives and strategy in his proposed performance man-
agement framework, which integrates ﬁve areas including
objectives; strategies and plans; target-setting; incentives
and reward; and information feedback.
However, the use of an organisation’s objectives and
strategy as the starting point is problematic. While most
models take shareholders’ expectations as the objective,
many organisations have recognized the need to satisfy
multiple and potentially competing goals (Chenhall, 2003).
There might be other stakeholders, apart from share-
holders, who are important (Ax and Bjornenak, 2005;
Emmanuel et al., 1990; Norreklit, 2000), and “the relative
importance given to different goals may well reﬂect the
relative power of different stakeholders” (Otley, 1999, p.
366).
Some studies advocate a stakeholder perspective in per-
formance measurement system design. For example, some
scholars have built performance measurement models
based on stakeholder theory and started from stakeholder
analysis (e.g. Atkinson et al., 1997; Neely et al., 2002);
Ax and Bjornenak (2005) reveal that one of the Swedish
versions of the balanced scorecard combine it with the
stakeholdermodel,with the term“balanced” interpreted as
a “balance” among stakeholders. However, because stake-
holder theory fails to provide corporate managers with a
single objective which might result in managerial confu-
sion, conﬂict, or even competitive failure,most stakeholder
models are only used in the public sector (Jensen, 2001;
McAdam et al., 2005).
Aiming to deﬁne proper relations between a single
objective function and stakeholder theory, Jensen (2001)
promotes ‘enlightened stakeholder theory’, which speci-
ﬁes long-term value maximization as the ﬁrm’s objective,
while focusing on meeting the demands of all important
corporate constituencies. However, Jensen does not pro-
vide a framework to link a ﬁrm’s objectives and strategy,
the expectations and contributions of its stakeholders, and
its performance measurement system.
2.2. Linking objectives/strategy to performance
measurement—critical performance variables
Not only are the objectives and strategy taken as the
starting point for the design of most performance mea-
surement systems, communicating objectives and strategy
through the organisation is the primary expected outcome
of a performancemeasurement system. Kaplan and Norton
(1996) argue that the balanced scorecard is not primar-
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ily an evaluation method, but rather a strategic planning
and communication device to provide strategic guidance
to divisional managers. Malina and Selto (2001) provide
empirical evidence that it does present signiﬁcant oppor-
tunities to develop, communicate, and implement strategy.
Longﬁeld-Smith (1997) also argues that senior managers
may select and use performance measurement in strategy
formation and implementation, and to stimulate strategic
change.
In the practice of performance measurement system
design, existing models use critical performance variables
as the link between the stated objectives/strategy and
performance measures. Critical performance variables are
deﬁned as “factors that must be achieved or implemented
successfully for the intended strategy of the business
to succeed” (Simons, 1995, p. 63). In today’s developed
economies, customer satisfaction and quality are often
cited as critical performance variables. Consequently, cus-
tomer satisfaction andquality of internal processes become
two perspectives in the balanced scorecard.
However, when western-developed models are applied
to a less developed economy, such as China, it should be
questioned whether those commonly cited critical perfor-
mance variables apply in the same way as they do in more
developed countries and whether other variables become
critical. For example, considering the existence of political
constraints in China as evidenced by previous studies (e.g.
O’Connor et al., 2006), the satisfaction of government may
also be one of the critical performance variables for Chinese
companies.
2.3. The factors affecting the nature of management
accounting change
In order to understand how management accounting
innovations have been diffused in different organisations, a
strand of studies has analysed the inﬂuencing factors in the
change process and identiﬁed the factors that either result
in, or do not result in, management accounting change
(e.g. Innes andMitchell, 1990; Cobb et al., 1995; Kasurinen,
2002; Ax and Bjornenak, 2005).
Studies on management accounting change in China
have contributed to this strand by identifying the factors
affecting the diffusion of management accounting innova-
tion in the Chinese context, as discussed in Section 1. There
are also numerous studies on Chinese SOEs from other per-
spectives, suchashumanresources andproperty rights (e.g.
Qian, 1996; Li, 1997; Lin et al., 1998; Sun, 2000; Xu, 2000).
For example, in a study that focused on organisation devel-
opment and change in Chinese SOEswith human resources
as central, Sun (2000) suggested that many organisation
development and change programswill encounter cultural
as well as institutional obstacles, including traditional cul-
tural values andbehavioural patterns, lack ofmotivation for
top executives to make any changes, and lack of training in
management skills.
Qian (1996) highlighted the interwoven problems of
high agency costs and political costs, which arose from the
interaction between the effective control bymanagers over
certain decisions (mainly the rights to use assets and to dis-
tribute income) and the ultimate control by government
over other decisions, such as top manager selection and
dismissal, and the approval of large investment projects.
Applying Busco et al.’s model (2007), these studies have
onlyprovidedexplanations forwhy changehappensordoes
not happen, but not for how change happens, or how those
factors affect the change process and shape the nature of
change.
Other studies contribute by focusing on exploring the
change process in an organisational context (e.g. Markus
and Pfeffer, 1983; Scapens and Roberts, 1993; Burns and
Scapens, 2000;Malina and Selto, 2001).Markus and Pfeffer
(1983), for example, claimed that the extent to which a
new system matches the existing organisational culture
andpower distribution inﬂuences the implementation suc-
cess. The strategies employed for achieving effectiveness
depend upon the goal of implementing the new system.
If the goal is to minimize resistance and maximize system
success, the system should be designed to resonate with
the existing organisational context. If the goal is to promote
organisational change, the issues of resistance and poten-
tial system failure should be addressed explicitly. Burns
and Scapens (2000) further conceptualize management
accounting change as a process, rather than as an outcome,
and emphasize the complexity of the process of change.
Taking into account the existence of culture and institu-
tional obstacles in China, as evidenced by previous studies,
management accounting change processes in the Chinese
context may be even less systematic and more political
(BurnsandVaivio, 2001). Therefore, itmaybemore relevant
to investigate the factors that shape a new management
accounting system in the process of diffusion rather than
the factors affecting diffusion rates (Abrahamson, 1991).
In summary, the reviewof the literature onperformance
measurement system design and management accounting
change has revealed the following three research gaps:
(i) Although there is acknowledgement of the existence
of different inﬂuencing forces on the stated objectives
and strategy, there is no theoretical framework that
provides adevice to identify those forces and toanalyse
their effects on performance measurement.
(ii) While critical performance variables are commonly
used to link objectives and strategy and perfor-
mancemeasurement, existingmodels do not provide a
framework to identify alternative critical performance
variables to those assumed in those studies.
(iii) Previous studies on management accounting change
in China focus on why change happens or does not
happen. There is a paucity of research on how change
happens in the Chinese context.
2.4. Proposed stakeholder analytical framework
In order to close some of the gaps identiﬁed from this
review, a stakeholder analytical framework was adopted
in this study. The framework, shown in Fig. 1, starts with
stakeholder analysis and seeks to identify the inﬂuenc-
ing forces behind the stated objectives and strategy and
relevant critical performance variances. Based on the iden-
tiﬁed critical performance variables, the ﬁnal version of
a performance measurement system is further shaped by
Author's personal copy
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Fig. 1. Stakeholder analytical framework: the proposed theoretical frame-
work for performance measurement system design.
the factors affecting the nature of management accounting
change.
This stakeholder analytical framework advocates using
stakeholder analysis as a tool to bridge the gap between
a ﬁrm’s objectives and strategy, and the environments in
which it operates. This facilitates the identiﬁcation of the
inﬂuencing forces behind the stated objectives, strategy,
and critical performance variables. As a result, a per-
formance measurement system can be designed as an
expression of objectives and strategy in a measurable way.
Within this framework, a full analysis of stakeholders
and their expectations and contributions has been taken as
a starting point for the following reasons:
(i) A full analysis of relevant stakeholders and their
relationships with the company provides a better
understanding of the external and internal environ-
ments, which is required for managing management
accounting change (Burns and Scapens, 2000). As
advocated by Freeman and McVea (2001, p. 10), stake-
holder theory “emphasizes active management of
the business environment, relationships and the pro-
motion of shared interests”. In terms of technique,
stakeholder analysis could provide an effective tool to
encapsulate the dynamic inﬂuences of external and
internal environments on the formulation of objec-
tives and strategy. All such inﬂuencing forces would
be reﬂected in the relationship between a particular
stakeholder and the company.
(ii) The relationship in the proposed stakeholder ana-
lytical framework between the expectations and
contributions of stakeholders and a company’s objec-
tives and strategy, is consistent with Jensen’s (2001)
concept of ‘enlightened stakeholder theory’. This
theory takes meeting the demands of all impor-
tant corporate stakeholders as a strategy to achieve
value maximization. Although stakeholder analysis is
applied, stakeholder theory is not viewed as a legiti-
mate contender to shareholder value maximization in
the above framework.
According to agency theory, having shareholders
(owners) as principals andmanagers as agents (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980), the objectives of a
company should represent the claimsof the sharehold-
ers. However, in order to maximize shareholder value,
“corporate managers must not only satisfy, but enlist
the support of, all corporate stakeholders—customers,
employees, managers, suppliers, local communities”
(Jensen, 2001, p. 9).
Those non-owner stakeholders do not have the right
to hire, ﬁre and compensate managers; and they have
no direct inﬂuence on the formulation of objectives
and decisions in an organisation, but they still exer-
cise power over the achievement of the organisation’s
objectives via internal or external mechanisms. Their
inﬂuence on the achievement of company objectives
ensures that managers have to satisfy their claims
through speciﬁc strategies. The increasing importance
of customer satisfaction is a good example.Whenmost
companies in developed economies deﬁne an objec-
tive as maximization of shareholder value, they have
to develop a speciﬁc strategy to ensure customer sat-
isfaction.
(iii) Taking into account the complexity and dynamism of
theChinesebusiness environment, a full analysis of the
expectations and contributions of all important cor-
porate stakeholders is essential if an understanding is
to be obtained of a company’s objectives and strategy,
whether stated or not, in Chinese organisations.
Before the 1980s, most of China’s enterprises were set
up and run by the government and the Chinese Communist
Party. In the late 1980s, Chinabegan to reform its traditional
enterprise system by issuing shares to public investors on
an experimental basis. At the end of the 1990s, two stock
exchanges were established, in Shanghai and Shenzhen.
A unique characteristic of the Chinese stock market is
that about90%of listedChinese companies are restructured
from state-owned enterprises, with the state retaining,
on average, a 65% shareholding in such companies (Chiou
and Lin, 2005). The government therefore plays an impor-
tant role in determining corporate objectives and strategy,
resulting in conﬂicts of interest between the govern-
ment, with its own political and social targets, and private
investors with their intentions of maximizing returns (Lin
et al., 1998). Another study also evidences the existence of
a less efﬁcient market, and a weak legal system in China
(Pistor and Xu, 2005).
Considering Chinese SOEs are still in the process of
reform, the co-existence of different forces and the changes
in their relative importance in forming goals make the
external and internal environments in which a Chinese
SOE operates more complex. A full analysis of stakehold-
ers’ expectations and contributions may help to present
a clearer picture of those forces that inﬂuence objectives
Author's personal copy
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and strategy; and, therefore, help to identify the critical
performance variables.
In order to examine the effectiveness of the proposed
framework in closing some of the research gaps, this study
addresses the following research questions:
(i) Is the stakeholder analytical framework effective in
identifying the inﬂuencing forcesbehindobjectives and
strategy; and identifying the critical performance vari-
ables in the Chinese context?
(ii) What factors affect the nature of change and shape the
performance measurement system during the process
of performancemeasurement systemdesign in the case
company?
3. Methodological considerations
Research cooperation between the authors and the case
company between October 2000 and March 2006 was a
precondition of this study. The ﬁrst phase of the research
project began in October 2000 and ﬁnished in December
2001, with the researchers as participative team members.
From October 2005 to March 2006, further reﬂective inter-
views were conducted in the case company.
3.1. Rationales of research methodology
In methodological terms, this study adopted an action
research approach emphasising collaboration between
researchers and practitioners (Avison et al., 2001). Of the
numerous deﬁnitions of action research, one of the most
widely applied is that of Rapoport (1970, p. 499): “action
research aims to contribute both to the practical concerns
of people in an immediate problematic situation and to
the goals of social science by joint collaboration within a
mutually acceptable ethical framework.”
Action research was adopted for two reasons:
(i) The insights that could be gained through action
research as claimed by other researchers (e.g. Liu and
Pan, 2007; Seal et al., 1999) are not achievable using
other research methods. In this study, the opportuni-
ties to participate in the design process provided the
researchers with a unique opportunity to experience
and closely observe how change happened.
(ii) Action research can be used to focus upon identifying
whether effective change has occurred in organisa-
tions. In this study, the existence of mutual interest
between researchers and the case company provided
a good starting point for interaction, cooperation and
intervention. In particular, we employed a positivist
approach to action research, which has been promoted
by accounting scholars (e.g. Kaplan, 1998; Baker, 2000).
This approach involves using apre-speciﬁed theoretical
framework to guide interventions. Through its adop-
tion, it was possible to apply the proposed stakeholder
analytical framework and to assess its effectiveness.
3.2. Case selection
Three factors were considered in selecting the case:
(i) The studywas limited to large-scaleSOEs. Themodern-
ization and, especially, the reform of the larger scale
SOEs is a central part of China’s economic reforms.
In 1996, some 5.6% of SOEs were large-scale and con-
tributed 63.3% of the gross output value of SOEs. From
these SOEs, the MM Group (MM) was selected. It is
a large-scale, conglomerate enterprise group—one of
the 39 “backbone”1 SOEs in China. Its core business
is foreign trade, with peripheral businesses in ﬁnance,
insurance, real estate and information technology; and
it owns 98 subsidiaries and joint ventures in China and
44 subsidiaries in 22 countries worldwide.
(ii) The intention was to focus on the factors shaping the
change in the process of performance measurement
system design, instead of the factors resulting – or not
resulting – in change. In order to do so, the research
site had to have a strong motivation to change. MM
appeared appropriate, meeting all the criteria iden-
tiﬁed by previous research as factors stimulating the
diffusion of innovation.
(iii) Access had to be available to both the case site
and to personnel. The Chief Finance Ofﬁcer and two
other members of the MM Finance function attended
the executive programme and training courses the
researchers gave in 2000. A full discussion was held
between the researchers and those senior managers
from MM, dealing with the concepts of performance
measurement and the needs of MM.
3.3. The research process
The research activities occurred over four phases.
3.3.1. Phase one: environment and stakeholder analysis,
October 2000 to December 2000
In order to gain a good understanding of the exter-
nal and internal environments in which MM is operating
and in order to identify the important stakeholders, the
researchers interviewedthe topmanagersofboth thegroup
and of ﬁve of its Chinese subsidiaries. Relevant documents
were collected and examined. The information gathered
covered the evolution of the relationship between the Chi-
nese government and MM, the development of China’s
markets (including capital markets, product markets and
labour markets), the MM corporate governance structure,
accounting reports, the stated objectives and strategy, and
the existing performance measurement system.
3.3.2. Phase two: agreeing on objectives and team
formation, January 2001
Based on the ﬁrst phase, the researchers had their ﬁrst
formalmeetingwith theVice-President and theCFOofMM.
The aim of the meeting was to seek mutual understanding
of the problemsMMwas facing and of the objectives of the
research project. This resulted in two outputs:
(i) the researchers and the top managers of the case com-
pany reachedanagreement on theneeds ofMMand the
1 The notion of “backbone” in China represents those large ﬁrms that
signiﬁcantly affect the success of the macro-economy and the quality of
life of the Chinese.
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Table 1
Sources of the interview data.
Interviewees Coding Roles in the project
Vice-President of the Board of Directors in charge of ﬁnancial management VPF Represents the Board of Directors; reserves the right of
project approval
The Chief Finance Ofﬁcer of MM CFO Participates in the design process acting head of the project
A chief ofﬁcer in charge of performance evaluation COPM Participates in both the design and implementation process
Two ofﬁcers from the Finance Ofﬁce of MM FO 1, 2 Participate in both the design and implementation process
Operations managers from the ﬁve selected Chinese subsidiaries OM 1-5 Participate in the implementation process
Financial managers from the ﬁve selected Chinese subsidiaries FM 1-5 Participate in the implementation process
objective of the project was being to communicate the
objectives and strategy through the organisation; and
(ii) aworking group for performancemeasurement system
design was formed and the researchers were ofﬁcially
delegated the leadership role in that group. The work-
ing group included four outsiders (the authors and two
research assistants) and four insiders from MM: the
CFO, a chief ofﬁcer from the Human Resources Depart-
ment, and two other ofﬁcers from the Finance Ofﬁce.
3.3.3. Phase three: design and implementation, February
2001 to December 2001
During this phase, the researchers were actively
immersed in the company, holding meetings with staff
at all levels including top management. These semi-
structured events ranged from 1-h individual interviews to
half-day small group meetings. The informants are listed
and coded in Table 1. The researchers also conducted 2 days
of training during the design and implementation process.
3.3.4. Phase four: reﬂective revisits, November 2005 to
March 2006
To investigate the effectiveness2 of the performance
measurement system designed during 2000 and 2001, MM
was revisited at the end of year 2005 with the aim of inter-
viewing the Chief Finance Ofﬁcer (CFO), the chief ofﬁcer
in charge of performancemanagement, and ﬁnancial man-
agers fromﬁve selected subsidiary companies for reﬂective
feedback on the project.
The interviewswith the CFO and the performanceman-
agement ofﬁcer were conducted face-to-face, each lasting
approximately 1h. These were tape-recorded and tran-
scribed. It was not possible to meet the ﬁnancial managers
from the subsidiary companies and their opinions on
the same issues as discussed in the two interviews were
gathered using a semi-structured questionnaire. The ques-
tionnaireswere sent to theﬁnancialmanagers at eachof the
ﬁve Chinese subsidiary companies. Three responses were
received. The questions covered by the interviews and the
semi-structured questionnaires are shown as Appendix A.
The outcomes of the revisits are presented and discussed
in the following sections of the paper.
2 How to assess the validity or effectiveness of a performancemeasure-
ment system is problematic. In this study, the performance measurement
system is viewed as a dependent variable and it is assumed that the
survival indicates a proper ﬁt between the performance measurement
system and the organisational context (see Longﬁeld-Smith, 1997, p. 226;
Chenhall, 2003, pp. 134–135; Ahrens and Chapman, 2006, pp.833–836 for
further discussion).
3.4. Data analysis
Access was provided to numerous information sources,
including archival data, formal and informal meetings, and
interviews. Due to concerns about conﬁdentiality from
MM, no audio recordings were made during the project
apart from two tape-recorded interviews in Phase four. The
names of the company and of individuals are disguised to
ensure conﬁdentiality. (Detailed descriptions of the case
company and the project are available from the authors
upon request.)
To limit possible subjective bias and to ensure the accu-
racy and validity of original data, two researchers were
present at all interviews and meetings. All the data gath-
ered were checked and veriﬁed by both the researchers
after each event.
Although this collaboration between researchers and
practitioners provided access to the ﬁeld site and informa-
tion sources, along with opportunities to promote change,
it is possible that the method of access could be a source
of bias (Malina and Selto, 2001). Based on Birnberg et
al.’s analysis of ﬁeld research (1990), the present study
might be subject to “demand” or “expectancy” effects.
“Demand effects” occur when individuals act in ways that
they believe a researcher desires. “Expectancy effects” arise
when a researcher’s expectations about a study inﬂuence
the process and outcome of the research.
For this reason, the following were adopted in order to
overcomepossiblebias and toenabledata triangulation: (1)
overtly consideringandexplicitlydiscussing thispossibility
during the research process; (2) verifying the data between
the researchers; and (3) comparingandcontrasting thedata
fromdifferent sources, e.g. the views frommanagers ofMM
and those of the ﬁve Chinese subsidiaries.
4. Case analysis
This section focuses on the ﬁrst research question:
whether the stakeholder analytical framework can be used
to identify the inﬂuencing forces behind stated objectives
and strategy; and to identify the critical performance vari-
ables in the case company. The case provides evidence
that supports theeffectivenessof the stakeholder analytical
framework described in this paper and also Jensen (2001)’s
enlightened stakeholder theory. It is through the analysis of
all important stakeholders’ expectations and contributions
that the forces behind MM Group’s stated objectives and
strategy and the relevant critical performance variables are
identiﬁed. The overall ﬁndings from the case analysis are
shown in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2. The overview of stakeholder analysis in the MM Group.
4.1. The evolution of the objectives and the inﬂuencing
forces behind it
The main objective of MM until the 1980s was “maxi-
mization of sales” to meet the state-owner’s requirement
and to accumulate foreign currency. Following Chinese SOE
reforms in 1980s, the market in which MM operates has
moved fromamonopolistic environment toa farmorecom-
petitive one, and the group has been actingmore andmore
like an independent commercial entity. Accordingly, this
objective was changed to “maximization of proﬁt” in the
1980sand then to “maximizationofproﬁtwithanemphasis
on net cash ﬂow” at the time of the study.
The state-owner reserves the power to hire, ﬁre and
compensate the executives and is the only force that has
a direct inﬂuence upon the formulation of objectives. Nev-
ertheless, the current objective statementhas encapsulated
the inﬂuence of the ownership structure and markets.
The ownership structure of MM and the characteris-
tics of Chinese capital markets make applying proﬁt to
express shareholder value instead of market capitalization
a reasonable choice. MM has its core enterprise listed on
the Shanghai Stock Exchange but still has many unlisted
business components within the group. Furthermore, as
state-ownership is not tradable, market capitalization and
market prices may be distorted andmay not be sufﬁciently
reliable to be used as objectives.
The inclusion of the phrase, “with an emphasis on net
cash ﬂow” in the stated objectives of MMmeans that there
is a requirement to achieve a positive net operational cash
ﬂowwithin the context of proﬁtmaximization. This reﬂects
the importance of risk control within the environment in
which MM operates. In general, the Chinese government
has learned lessons from its past experience of economic
reform regarding the problems of using proﬁt maximiza-
tion as the sole objective3. The problem of “triangle debt”
4 among SOEs in China has further forced MM to acknowl-
edge this aspect of risk in its operations.
The requirement relating to net cash ﬂow within the
objective reﬂects the state-owner’s desire to limit the cash-
ﬂow-related risks inherent in proﬁt maximization and to
improve risk management. The challenge MM faced was
how to communicate this to its subsidiaries.
3 Since Kaplan and Norton’s work (1987), there has been extensive dis-
cussion on the disadvantages of using proﬁtmaximization as an objective.
China’s state-owned enterprise reform experienced problems using this
objective in a restricted market (e.g. Jones and Xiao, 1999; Hassard et al.,
1999).
4 “Triangle debt” refers tomajor chains of debt involvingmore than two
Chinese SOEs. For example, A is in debt to B which is in debt to C which is
in debt to A, and so on. It caused a serious ﬁnancial crisis in Chinese SOEs
during the early 1990s. For a more general discussion regarding “triangle
debt” in China, see Hassard et al. (1999).
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4.2. The formulation of strategy and the inﬂuencing
forces behind it
The strategy of MM described by the managers of the
group was results oriented:
While market share usually depends upon competitive
ability in a market economy, it has an additional facet in
MM: business size (turnover). As observed by one of the
operational managers (OM1) early in the research:
“The size of the business is vital for retaining suppliers
and for keeping negotiating power in local and interna-
tionalprocurement. It is alsoan important consideration
for the government in distributing import quotas.”
There were, therefore, four elements to the strategy of
MM:
• Proﬁt,
• Net cash ﬂow,
• Market share,
• Turnover.
Stakeholder analysis revealed that the strategy reﬂected
the state-owner’s requirements and also suggested a
response to the expectations of other stakeholders.
The information gathered from the interviews together
with knowledge from the study of the external markets
(including the capital market, product market and labour
market) revealed that the stakeholders involved in MM,
apart from the state-owner, are (i) customers, (ii) suppli-
ers, (iii) banks, (iv) government (as regulator, and political,
social and economic custodian), and (v) employees.
Customers and suppliers have important inputs in strat-
egy formulation. Themajor business ofMM is international
trade, so the relationshipswith customers and suppliers are
vital to its success. The interviewswith the topmanagers of
the subsidiary companies highlighted that themost impor-
tant reason for customers and suppliers to maintain their
relationship with MM – in an ever more competitive mar-
ket – is the group’s credit policy: customers are awarded
credit and suppliers are paid on time. This policy brings
MM strong competitive advantages, especially when the
risk element is increasingly acknowledged by Chinese SOEs
due to the problem of “triangle debts”, as quoted by the
operations manager of one of the Chinese subsidiaries:
“Sufferingheavily from ‘triangledebts’, somesmall busi-
nesses have completely givenup credit sales. Forme, the
status of a large SOEwith its strong ﬁnancing position is
a trump-card in gaining customer and supplier trust.”
Maintaining competitive advantage had two implica-
tions for MM:
(i) It made the efﬁciency of working capital management
crucial to business success. It is, therefore, shownasone
of the critical performance variables in Fig. 2.
(ii) It also results in dependence on banks for business
ﬁnancing, represented by the dotted line in Fig. 2.
Due to China’s less developed capital markets, Chi-
nese SOEs, including MM, rely heavily on banks for
ﬁnancing (PBC, 2002). The interview with the CFO of MM
revealed that themost important criterionofChinesebanks
in making loan decisions is turnover, and the group has to
keep turnover growing at a rate which satisﬁes the banks.
At one time, the government policy of distributing
import quotas played a vital role in the group’s success.
Although this factor had become less important for MM
by the time the study was conducted, it was still promi-
nent in some of its subsidiary companies. This encouraged
MM to include satisfying government as a consideration
in the development of its strategy. The Chinese govern-
ment wishes to maintain control in the industry, to collect
sufﬁcient foreign currency to maintain a favourable bal-
ance in foreign currency inﬂow and outﬂow, and also to
reduce unemployment. For MM, these governmental goals
required that itmaintainmarket share and turnover growth
at certain levels.
The position of employees inMM is affected by a variety
of factors. They are valuable non-ﬁnancial resources inMM,
because retaining customer and supplier networks relies,
to some extent, upon the experience of employees. As evi-
dencedbyother studies (e.g. ParkandLuo, 2001;Efferinand
Hopper, 2007), it is particularly important in the context
of Chinese guanxi, whereby business networks are based
on inter-personal, mutually dependent relationships. The
good status of the company, the higher remuneration that
comes with working for a big ﬁrm, along with the large
Chinese labour market all contribute towards maintaining
employee loyalty.
However, from the viewpoint of its corporate gover-
nance structure, the power of employees in MM is limited.
WhileMMhas anEmployeeCouncil consisting of employee
representatives and a Trade Union, the corporate gover-
nance structure is based on the traditional system and
they sit shoulder to shoulder with three boards: the Share-
holderMeeting; theBoardofDirectors; and theSupervisory
Board. As required by Chinese Corporate Law, the latter
includes one employee representative. As a result and con-
sistent with the literature (e.g. Xiao et al., 2004), the roles
of the Trade Union and the Supervisory Board are very lim-
ited. Consequently, MM employees rely on the government
to protect their interests, rather than on their own direct
involvement in decision-making.
An overview of the expectations and contributions of
stakeholders is provided in Fig. 2. The contributions of
non-owner stakeholders are vital for the achievement of
the objectives due to the inﬂuences of the factors located
in both MM’s external and internal environments: market
forces, the state, corporate governance structure, and cul-
ture. MM had, therefore, to develop its strategy to meet
those stakeholders’ expectations.
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The satisfaction of customers, suppliers, and employees
relies heavily on the relationship with banks, and govern-
ment support, as shown by the dotted line in Fig. 2. The
expectations of the banks and the governmentmust be rec-
ognized, which explains why there are multiple elements
to MM’s stated strategy. Accordingly, the critical perfor-
mance variables can be identiﬁed as proﬁt, net cash ﬂow,
turnover,market share and the efﬁciencyofworking capital
management.
The proposed stakeholder analytical framework does
not itself provide standardized solutions for the design of
performance measurement systems. However, based on
MM’s critical performance variables identiﬁed from the
stakeholder analysis, the performance measurement sys-
temforMMusesa four-perspectivebalanced scorecard (see
Appendix B). The factors that gave rise to the development
of this device are discussed in Section 5.
Thus, adoption of a stakeholder analytical framework
shifted the starting point to stakeholder analysis. This was
used to identify the inﬂuencing forces behind the stated
objectives and strategy, and the critical performance vari-
ables. The application of stakeholder analysis in the case
company helped to:
(i) demonstrate how the company’s objectives and strat-
egy were affected by environmental factors;
(ii) reveal the full meaning (including subtext) of the
stated objectives and strategy; and,
(iii) create an appropriate tool for identifying the critical
performance variables of the organisation.
The links between the stakeholders’ contributions and
expectations and the company’s objectives and strategy,
as identiﬁed from the case analysis, also provided empir-
ical support for Jensen’s (2001) ‘enlightened stakeholder
theory’.
5. Factors determining the nature of change and
shaping the performance measurement system
From observation of the design process and the revisit
feedback, the main characteristic of the performance mea-
surement system was identiﬁed as its symbolic function.
Previous studies have suggested that innovation diffu-
sion fulﬁls a symbolic function, such as signalling a need
for innovative behaviour or signifying a particular organ-
isational image (Markus and Pfeffer, 1983; Abrahamson,
1991). In the case company, the evidence shows that the
performance measurement system has been used as a
symbol to attract managers’ attention and to inﬂuence
decision-making.
Furthermore, because of the observed involvement of
compromises and inertial forces in the change process
(Burns and Scapens, 2000), the nature of change in the
case company could be identiﬁed as evolutionary andpath-
dependent.
The factors determining the characteristics of the per-
formance measurement system and the nature of change
in the case company are discussed below.
5.1. The expected outcomes of the project
At the ﬁrst stage of research, the executives involved
stated that the main expected outcome of the project
was to communicate MM’s objectives and strategy to
the subsidiary companies. It was essential for the perfor-
mance measurement system to operate successfully that
the required emphasis on net cash ﬂow was understood
by and ‘visible’ to them all. However, although MM tried
to encourage its operational managers to focus on net cash
ﬂow, they did not all fully understand the conceptual dif-
ference between proﬁt and cash ﬂow because most of
them were specialists in trade, not specialists in ﬁnance
or accounting.
In the revisit from November 2005 to March 2006, the
CFO of MM acknowledged that the most important con-
tribution of the performance measurement system was
the improvement it brought in communication between
MM and its subsidiary companies regarding objectives
and strategy. The effectiveness of a new ratio: Net Cash
Flow/Operating Proﬁt5 was also acknowledged by partic-
ipants from headquarters and subsidiaries.
“Almost all state-owned companies in China used to
only focus on the quantity side of income: turnover,
accounting proﬁt, etc. This resulted in a huge number of
bad debts. . .The introduction of NCF/OP changed this. It
is the ﬁrst time that operationalmanagers knowwhat is
meant by cash; it is the ﬁrst time they have understood
the link between proﬁt and cash ﬂow; it is the ﬁrst time
that they really care about cash.” (CFO of MM)
The CFO further explained that, although the evalua-
tion of performance was not directly linked to ﬁnancial
reward, failure to meet the NCF/OP target had two impor-
tant effects: it was a strong signal to subsidiary companies
that ignoring cash ﬂow was not encouraged by MM; and
it provided direction for improvement because through
this ratio, managers understood the practical relationship
between proﬁt and cash ﬂow and knew how the opera-
tional activities affect cash ﬂow. These comments illustrate
the symbolic power of the new performancemeasurement
system.
5.2. Political constraints
O’Connor et al. (2006) identiﬁed political constraints
as a factor hindering change in Chinese SOEs. They found
a direct positive impact of political constraints upon
incentives when the basis for determining incentives is
consistent with the objectives of the political constraints.
Consistent with O’Connor et al. the ﬁndings of the present
study demonstrate that government interference acts as a
hindrance to change.
It was also observed that the fact that the perfor-
mance measurement system was designed to reﬂect the
objectives of political constraints acted as a motivator for
successful implementation of the performance measure-
5 In limiting the scope of our discussion to the intended objectives, we
are not able to provide detail in this paper of the calculation and applica-
tion of this ratio. Further information is available in Li (2001) (in Chinese).
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ment system in the case company. It provided explanations
for the positive inﬂuence of political constraints on incen-
tives observed by O’Connor et al. (2006), and also supports
the force-selection perspective in innovation diffusion
(Abrahamson, 1991). Consequently, the nature of change is
more evolutionary and path-dependent, and the ﬁnal ver-
sion of the performancemeasurement system represents a
“satisfactory solution in a boundedly rational sense” (Burns
and Scapens, 2000, p. 12).
The effects of the government’s interference on the per-
formancemeasurement systemdesign in the case company
include a direct inﬂuence on the choice of performance
measures and an indirect inﬂuence on the setting of proﬁt
targets. In the case company, the Chinese government’s
desire for industry control and sustaining employment
was reﬂected in measures of turnover and foreign currency
inﬂows from exports in the revised balanced scorecard as
shown in Appendix B. However, the government’s interfer-
ence in setting proﬁt targets was found to have hindered
the proposed changes.
One of the problemsMM facedwas how to set the proﬁt
targets for its subsidiaries: the distribution of non-ﬁnancial
resources, such as customer and supplier networks and
government policies, was not consistent across the sub-
sidiary companies. For example, subsidiaries with a longer
history might have developed stronger customer and sup-
plier networks, or some might be in less competitive
markets and have advantages because of government poli-
cies. Thismade their ﬁnancial returns non-comparable and
made it difﬁcult to evaluate their performance.
MM used to set different target returns on investment
(ROI) for different subsidiary companies, implicitly tak-
ing into account the uneven distribution of non-ﬁnancial
resources.Usuallyhigher targetROIswere set for subsidiary
companies with longer periods of operation, more beneﬁt
from government policies, and operations in less com-
petitive markets. However, because of the lack of explicit
recognition and measures of these resources, the required
return could only be expressed in subjective terms. This
provided opportunities for subsidiary managers to com-
plain about unfairness and meant the annual budgeting
process became an endless bargaining process. In the end,
the targets set were only accepted because of hierarchical
authority structure of the group. Performance measure-
ment failed to either provide incentives or to improve goal
congruence.
The quest for a solution to this situation was one of the
main reasons MM Group sought help from outside. How-
ever, the need to ﬁnd a solution ceased in 2001 when the
state-owner issued a new policy on the setting of proﬁt tar-
gets for MM that required proﬁt to be in excess of both the
average proﬁt over the previous 3 years and the previous
year’s proﬁt. MM solved its ROI problem by adopting this
policy in setting the target proﬁt for its subsidiary compa-
nies.
This method of setting proﬁt targets emerged as the
main area of complaint from the subsidiary companies
during our revisits. The problems included game-playing
in the target-setting process and earnings manage-
ment. The following quote provides an example of these
problems:
“Last year we truthfully reported our high earnings and
then have been set a higher target, compared to other
subsidiary companies. We had a difﬁcult year this year
and failed tomeet this target.We are certainly not going
to accept the target for next year easily. We are going to
‘cry’ loudly, because it works” (FM 1).
Although the state-owner set the target proﬁt based
on the previous years’ ﬁnancial returns, MM could still
have used differentmethods to set targets for its subsidiary
companies, but the executives of MM had no incentives to
make change. Such lack of incentive is largely the result of
government control over the evaluation and rewarding of
executives of large SOEs.
Because of the nature of state-owned enterprises and
the importance of MM to the economy, the performance
evaluation and promotion of MM’s executives are under
the control of the Chinese government. The requirements
and opinions of government ofﬁcials responsible for nom-
inating and promoting senior executives were the greatest
concern for MM’s executives, and for senior executives in
Chinese SOEs in general (e.g. Sun, 2000; O’Connor et al.,
2006).
Although thegovernmentdoesnotdirectlydictatehowa
performance measurement system should be designed, its
power is sufﬁcient to force the executives to prioritise the
government’s desires. ForMM, consideration of the uneven
distribution of non-ﬁnancial resources requires a complete
database of customers, suppliers, etc. This takes time to set
upand itmightnotbeexplicitly shown in the list of achieve-
ments of MM’s executives. They prefer an easier approach
that demonstrates the direct linkage between the perfor-
mance required by the state-owner and the performance
to be achieved by the subsidiary companies.
The way the performance measurement system has
been designed to resonate the political constraints acts
as a motivator for the successful implementation of the
new performance measurement system in the case com-
pany because it is aligned with the executives’ interests. It
reﬂects a compromise between thenewsystemand inertial
forces. The nature of change has, therefore, been deter-
mined as evolutionary and path-dependent.
5.3. Embedding existing practice within the new model
The embedding of existing techniques within the new
model received some support from previous studies. Some
researchers argue that a new model needs to be rooted in
the management and the organisation, so that both lan-
guage and comprehension can develop (Norreklit, 2000;
Malina and Selto, 2001). Embedding other techniques
within new models has been suggested as an important
tool for reinforcing the diffusion process in a Swedish case
(Ax and Bjornenak, 2005). The present case study shows
that the acknowledgment of contributions from existing
practice helps to secure the support of practitioners and to
improve comprehension of the new system, thereby reduc-
ing resistance.
The ﬁrst example of embedding existing practices in the
case companywas the inclusionofmultiplemeasures in the
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revised four-perspective balanced scorecard. The applica-
tion of multi-measures is common practice in China. For
example, it is recommended in the “Handbook of state-
owned company performance measurement”, issued by the
ChineseMinistryof Financeandapplied to theperformance
evaluation of SOEs throughout China (Chinese Ministry of
Finance, 1996).
In addition, the adjustment and overruler perspectives
in the previous performance measurements were both
retained. Technically, the measures appearing under the
adjustment perspective could be included under the ﬁrst
or second perspective of the balanced scorecard. Theywere
kept apart because MM used to separate market share and
its questionnaire on the quality of budgeting from other
measures in order to highlight their strategic and man-
agerial importance. The overruler perspective has been
applied in MM’s control system since the 1980s, and has
been used to limit risk when allowing managers to del-
egate decision-making, thereby allowing the organisation
to maximize ﬂexibility and creativity. The functions of this
overruler perspective in MM are similar to “business con-
duct boundaries” and “strategic boundaries” described by
Simons (1995).
This approachof embedding the existingpractice is seen
as instrumental inhelping thenewmodel tobecome rooted
in management and within the organisation in terms of
both language and comprehension. However, this approach
may also represent the inﬂuence of existing routines and
methods on the new system, therefore reinforcing the evo-
lutionary and path-dependent nature of change.
5.4. User participation
The views presented by previous studies on the effec-
tiveness of user participation are ambiguous. While it can
be argued that user participation itself is not a determi-
nant of system success (e.g. Markus and Pfeffer, 1983),
there are also researchers who suggest that it is impor-
tant for ensuring internal commitment (e.g. Haas and
Kleingeld, 1999; Norreklit, 2000). The ﬁndings of the
present study support the second view of user participa-
tion: the active participation of the executives in the case
company helped to reduce resistance to the introduction
of new concepts and contributed to continuous improve-
ment.
For example, the concept of earnings before inter-
est and taxation was introduced as the proﬁt indicator
to match measurements with the delegation of respon-
sibilities, as the managers in the subsidiary companies
do not have decision-making authority on ﬁnancing and
taxation. It was also suggested that the subsidiary com-
panies apply variable cost, ﬁxed cost and contribution
margins in their budgeting and feedback-reporting process
to better match the responsibilities delegated to their sub-
sidiaries. Resistance to these new concepts was very strong
in the ﬁrst meeting where proposals were discussed with
operational and ﬁnancial managers from the subsidiary
companies. When it was reported to the Vice-president,
he announced that the proposals had his support and
that managers in the subsidiary companies were required
to undertake independent study to gain a full under-
standing of the new concepts. The problem was easily
solved. In this instance, user participation did not just
alleviate resistance; it becameadeterminant of systemsuc-
cess.
Feedback from the revisit also showed that the active
participation of managers contributed to continuous
improvement. The introduction and proper understanding
of the concept of earnings before interest and tax trigged
the further upgrading of the ﬁnancial management sys-
tem in the case company. During the revisit, the CFO of
MM described it as a by-product of the new performance
measurement system.
5.5. The unavailability of databases
Considering the importance of non-ﬁnancial resources
highlighted by stakeholder analysis, during the design
process phase it was suggested by the researchers that
there should be a measurement of the value added
by non-ﬁnancial resources to encourage retention and
strengthening of the relationship with stakeholders.
However, the application of this suggestion was post-
poned because, at that time, MM had not ﬁnished the
development of its database on customer and supply net-
works.
The unavailability of this database reinforced resistance
to the proposed change in setting proﬁt targets within the
group. Because a consideration of the uneven distribution
of non-ﬁnancial resources in setting proﬁt targets necessi-
tates measures of these resources, the executives of MM
do not have sufﬁciently strong motives to build such a
database. This factor has acted as a barrier to the proposed
change.
5.6. The effects of national culture
The dominant Chinese cultural values are documented
ashighpowerdistance, highuncertainty avoidanceand low
individualism (Hofstede, 1980, 1983). Respect for hierar-
chy or high power distance is still deep rooted among the
majority of the Chinese people and greatly inﬂuences Chi-
nesebusiness culture. Efferin andHopper (2007) evidenced
its effects on the management control system of a Chinese
Indonesian company. The effects of Chinese culture on the
following two aspects were observed in our case:
(i) The Chinese respect for hierarchy strengthened the
effects of political constraints and users’ participa-
tion, either of which may further facilitate or hinder
change. InMM’s case, employees’ obedience, stemming
from the Chinese cultural value of vertical social order,
played an important role in the change process. For
example, as discussed earlier, it reinforced the effec-
tiveness of interventions by executives to overcome
resistance to new ideas. It also helped the subjective
proﬁt targets to work even when they raised issues of
unfairness, game-playing and earnings management.
Whether this cultural value facilitates or hinders
changedependsonattitudes at higher levels in thehier-
archy. In one case, it acted as a facilitator because of the
support of executives for the change; in another, it acted
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as a barrier because of the unwillingness of executives
to embrace the proposed change.
(ii) The Chinese cultural value of individual “face” and
reputation enforced the symbolic effects of the perfor-
mance measurement system. In the case company, if a
subsidiary, especially a large one with a good reputa-
tion, does not achieve its target, the managers will lose
“face”.
“If they have been publicised as one of the three worst
subsidiaries in the group, they would feel disgraced and
would try their best to earn back their face and reputa-
tion.” (MM CFO during the revisit)
6. Conclusions and suggestions for further research
By focusing on the process of designing a performance
measurement system in a Chinese SOE, this study pro-
vides a framework to integrate stakeholder analysis and the
design of a performance measurement system, and sheds
light on the factors that affect the change process and shape
the performance measurement system in the Chinese con-
text.
This paper is an attempt to communicate China’s man-
agement accounting practice to a broader audience, thus
making a contribution to our knowledge of management
accounting practice in developing countries. While most
previous studies have focused on the factors motivating
the adoption of management accounting innovation, this
study complements the management accounting change
literaturebyprovidingevidenceonhowanewperformance
measurement system has been shaped and how the nature
of change has been determined in the Chinese context. The
ﬁndings may also be informative to policy-makers, man-
agers and consultants seeking to promote the diffusion of
management accounting innovations in China and other
developing countries.
Most performance measurement models from previ-
ous studies implicitly assume the existence of clearly
stated objectives and strategies, consistency between
stated strategies and strategies undertaken, and eas-
ily identiﬁable critical performance variables. When,
as in China, these assumptions appear less realistic,
the acknowledgment of inﬂuences from external and
internal environments becomes critically important. In
this action research project, a stakeholder analytical
framework was developed to identify the inﬂuencing
forces behind stated objectives and strategies and to
bridge the gaps between environments, stated objec-
tives/strategies, and performance measurement. The case
study demonstrated the effectiveness of this stake-
holder analytical framework, and also provided empirical
support for Jensen’s ‘enlightened stakeholder theory’
(2001).
The study of the design process highlights the factors
shaping the performance measurement system in the case
company, namely: expected outcomes; political constraints;
embedding existing practice; user participation; database
unavailability; and culture. In communicating objectives
and strategy, the new performance system has fulﬁlled a
symbolic function in signalling a strategic focus and affect-
ing decision-making. Political constraints and database
unavailability appear to be barriers to change, but the
careful and tactical consideration of political constraints
in performance measurement system design provided
motives for executives to embrace evolutionary change
and ensured the successful implementation of the new
system. The active participation of users and the integra-
tion of existing good practices contributed to reducing
resistance and promoting continuous improvement. These
factors have been reinforced by the Chinese culture and,
together, they determine the evolutionary nature of change
in this case.
Of the identiﬁed factors, some derive from or are
affected by the external and/or internal environments of
large Chinese SOEs. Further research that reﬂects upon
whether the level of political constraint, the extent of the
availability of required databases, and the level of user
involvement will have positive or dysfunctional effects
upon thenature ofmanagement accounting change and the
use of management accounting techniques in such compa-
nies would be worthwhile.
The way that different expected outcomes affect a per-
formance measurement system and the nature of change
remains unexamined. For this case company, the research
focused on the performance measurement system; while
the company’s symbolic function might be encouraged by
other formal or informal control systems, such as eval-
uation and reward policy, or organisational culture. An
examination of these other systems and how they function
would be interesting topics for further research.
Three limitations of the present study are worthy of
attention:
(i) While the collaboration between the researchers and
the managers in the case company promoted collabo-
ration and intervention, it may also have resulted in a
degree of bias.
(ii) Limited to one particular case company, the ﬁndings
may not be generalisable to all Chinese SOEs.
(iii) Althoughpositive commentsweremadebyMMduring
the revisit, the effectiveness of the proposed theoret-
ical stakeholder analytical framework and whether it
adds value remain unexamined at the time of writing,
both in the particular case of MM and in general.
Finally, this study presents a stakeholder analytical
frameworkwhich ithasdemonstratedcanbeused toobtain
an understanding of a company’s objectives and strategy,
and to identify its critical performance variables. By focus-
ing on how change happens, the study also reveals how the
nature of change has been determined and how a perfor-
mance measurement system has been shaped in a Chinese
context.
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Appendix A.
The questions covered by interviews and semi-
structured questionnaires in revisit during October 2005
to December 2005.
Part one, changes of the environmental context since
the research project completed in 2001.
Part two, amendments to the performance measure-
ment system since it was implemented in 2001.
Part three, comments on the effectiveness of the perfor-
mance measurement system in communicating objectives
and strategy, and other outcomes achieved from the imple-
mentation of this system.
Part four, problems experienced and lessons
learnt in implementing the performance measurement
system.
Appendix B.
The revised balance scorecard (RBSC) designed for the
MM Group.
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